Introduction 1
The task of Empire is the... scientific conquest of its physical, and, shall we not be bold and say, ultimately of its political problems. [ We must ] endeavour ... to acquire that knowledge in scientific manner, and by scientific methods, which shall enable us to appreciate, in the first place, the vast, the incalculable natural resources which are present in our possession under the Flag-the means of utilising these instruments of material power for the benefit of our race.
2
Thus Alfred Deakin, Prime Minister of Australia, in the presence of Sir Wilfrid Laurier of Canada, responded to the toast of 'Our Guests' at a combined session of the British Empire League and the British Science Guild in May 1907. The occasion-the Colonial Prime Ministers' meeting in London-presented a particularly appropriate moment for the condensation of typically volatile sentiments about the organic unity of science and empire, that had suffused the atmosphere of imperial relations for a generation. Today, the occasion gives Australians a point of departure, and reflection from which to assess, looking backwards, the picture of colonial science at the turn of the century, and forward to the promise in store for science in the service of a federal nation, loyal to Empire, but increasingly conscious of its own priorities.
Between 1900 and 1915, Australia was per capita one of the most prosperous nations on earth. This came about partly by foreign investment, partly by protective tariffs, and partly by the convenient absence of expensive defence commitments. But it also arose from the wealth generated by increasingly productive sectors of primary industry, in agriculture, wool, and, intermittently, minerals. Above all, it was a success story symbolised by 'Federation wheat,' developed by William Fairer and F.B.Guthrie-men who combined the skills of 'practical genetics' and systematic chemistry.
tions effort, wartime experience contributed substantially to postwar manufacturing industry, just as wartime medical service benefited Australian research in parasitology and pharmacology. 9 It is undoubtedly correct to see the war as a turning point in the relations of science and government in Australia, as elsewhere in the Empire, in America and in Europe.
10
But if we cast our eyes back to the decade before the war, we may find a rich soil of incipient traditions, germinating with ideas which were not only to give shape to wartime decisions, but also to foreshadow later Australian attitudes towards the use of science for national purposes. Ten years ago, I outlined, in a schematic way, a series of historical stages, or phases, through which I considered that Australian (and possibly other Dominion) tendencies in science had developed.
11 1 intended this to be not so much an explanatory device, as a heuristic framework for testing hypotheses. Since that time, I have been filling in the picture where I can, and falsifying the 'model' where I cannot. I have also been trying to identify nodal points where one can see intersections between the discourses of science as culture, and as cultural agency.
In so doing, I have followed cultural historians in attempting to articulate the associations of science within what Michael Roe has called the 'bourgeoisie hegemony,' the system of socio-economic ideas that dominated the contrary imaginations of colonial Australia since the early nineteenth century. 12 It is debatable whether any single theory of culture can be applied to all Australia, with its urban population of city-states and its pastoral economy, its mythologies embracing, in the words of Francis Adams, coastal plain and inland desert. 13 Australia has been well-described as having not one but three 'founding' cultures-the convict-cum military culture of New South Wales which spread to Tasmania, Victoria, and Queensland, the gentlemanfarmer colony of Western Australia, and the squire-farmer colony of South Australia. Indeed, given the intellectual distance between Melbourne and Sydney, it is doubtful that one culture can be said to embrace all Australian intellecutal life, whether in the 19th century or since.
14 But Roe is certainly right in asking us to think about the affiliations and transmissions of ideas that historically linked Australians in all the colonies to their counterparts in Britain and the United States, especially in the years leading up to Federation, when Australians began to sail as a nation into uncharted constitutional seas. 15
'Efficient Imperialism 9 and Progressive Australia
For this purpose, I want to consider a particular formative phrase in the 'passages of imperial science' occurring between Federation and 1915-a period in which we find within science an important interplay between intercolonial commitments to Federalism-as economic and political motive, linked symbolically and in fact with the interests of national defence-and continuing Empire loyalties, best expressed in terms of 'imperial efficiency.' In Australia, this period saw a new phase of 'federal' science, inspired by a similar concern for 'national efficiency' that emerged in Britain during the 1890-in response partly to the challenges of American, German and Japanese competition, and partly to the tragedy of the Anglo-Boer war, and its devastating indictments of national mishandling. A conceptual strategy for 'Efficient Empire' developed as a natural counterpart of national efficiency, with portable doctrines criss-crossing frontiers of ideology and party. In Britain, R. B. Haldane, A. J. Balfour, Lord Rosebery and the Webbs found resonance with Lord Milner and Joseph Chamberlain in seeking to set Britain right through reforms in administrative, military, commercial and academic life. 'Wake up Britain!,' the Prince of Wales had declaimed. Now that Edward was King, the colonies were to help the Empire by helping themselves, so that the whole would be the sum of more than its parts. In this imperial design, science and its instruments of method were essential scaffolding.
Historians from Bernard Semmel to Geoffrey Searle have written of the 'social imperialism' of the period in Britain, with its lateral endorsement of social Darwinism, eugenics, and the application of 'scientific method' to all walks of life. 18 Whilst absorbing these doctrines, Australians saw similar values emerg-ing in the American 'Progressive' movement, employing the rhetoric of scientific method from the conservation of woodlands and the creation of national parks to the Taylorite perfection of manufacturing industry. 19 Aethestics, utility, and ecology formed the secular trinity of America's 'efficiency cult,' and Australia was not to be spared its missionary influences.
Although differences between the two countries were many, similarities reached deeply. Progressivism in America grew not from the circumstances of separate colonies but within what Robert Wiebe has called a 'distended society,' during three decades in which a quilt of regions emerged from the destruction of the Civil War and a postwar depression to confront a new continental destiny. From a country of small town values and regional dependencies grew a nation shaped by industrialisation, mechanisation and urbanisation, with vast consequences for international trade and political affairs. New institutions at local, State and Federal levels valorised middle-class expectations of 'continuity and regularity, functionality and rationality, administration and management.' At the heart of the progressive impulse lay an impatience with patchwork government, and a commitment to reform through bureaucracy. Whether in urban reform, public education, or the protection of the 'race,' government conducted along scientific principles would bring 'opportunity, progress, order and community' to the nation as a whole. 'Organic cities' of brotherhood and settlement would become functional, efficient places to live. American society, with its complex legacy of colonialsm and immigration, would improve not by accident, but by design.
20
To an extent guided less by philosophy than by comparison, Australia offered a complementary vision, translated into the language of home and empire. From the 'gas and water socialism' and public health services of Britain's leading municipal boroughs, to the Crown's Development Commission and its strategy for scientific agriculture, came an Australian response to the half-finished work of Victorian reform. Community, order, and progress could be the expectation of Britons, home and overseas, and by implication, that of 3.7 million Australians (few mentioned the 95,000 Aborigines) as well. The tempo of progress would be set by modern science and its methods. 1905, of which they could command a small proportion, was only 344-their influence on the University community, at least, seems measurable. 25 Their local program was specifically Australian, and they spoke to a context receptive to their message. In America, the zealous pursuit of nature, and Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier interpretation of American history, complemented Australia's search for a manifest destiny of its own, which lay not only in the conquest of external nature, but also in the taming of human nature, and in the provision of social justice. W.G. Spence's Australia's Awakening of 1909 brought labour on side with science, a model for Lockyer's attempt to unite labour and capital in the mutual enjoyment of scientific method. Deakin embraced the British message, but he welcomed the American ethos even more, just as he welcomed the American fleet, without Colonial Office approval. Australia's destiny would be in the hands of its scientists. With ultimate confidence, Deakin even let his daughter marry one.
26
With science would come progress, and with progress, profit. The lesson was a legacy of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. But the familiar messages of rationality hid deep contradictions. Progressivism shared their moral ambiguity, overtly equivocal in matters of distribution and reward. But progressivism as a mentality suited the empirical temper, and translated to Australia, its assumptions and ambiguities gained a hold at once more compelling and less well defined than in either Britain or the United States.The 'search for order' in Wiebe's America led equally in Australia to the application of 'method' to all departments of state and every discipline of knowledge. The rise of a federal bureaucracy, where there had been none coincided with a new interest in guiding the applications of science to agriculture, public health, weather forecasting, railway transportation, electrification and radio communication. That Australia's future was problematic, was preached by reports of falling fertility rates, and widespread fears of the country's becoming 'unfit' to continue in the race among nations.
27 By common reasoning, notionally unfettered university science, whether in physics or psychology, Arts or anthropology, must be turned to public service; and scientific research must be assessed at least in part by practical outcomes. Such pragmatic progressivism gave a particular connotation to educational reform in the early years of the Commonwealth, notably among the four universities in Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide, and Queensland, which prided themselves on their effusive 'practicality,' but which sometimes failed to convince a sceptical public of their utilitarian value.
Federation and the Cult of Science
The period between Federation and the Great War is remembered for many important developments in the relations between science and society in Australia. Second, for progressives everywhere, the key-word was 'efficiency,' a concept suitably class-less and egalitarian, rooted in equality of access and opportunity, yet a concept that was intrinsically opposed to no interest. In Britain, as Lord Rosebery put it, there were Progressives who were not Liberals, but there were no Liberals who were not Progressives. 32 The same might be said of 'OneNation' Tories. The argument had a pleasing democratic ring. Its application, to be sure, could harbour other messages. Manifestly, the efficient behaviour of one class could be easily translated into the profit of another; the technical preferment of the workman, into the pockets of the manager. In Australia, similar contradictions emerged. Efficiency appealed to the apostles of applied learning and technical training, and to those in the workforce who by the early years of the century far outnumbered those in university education. Efficiency became an agreeable platform for coalition conservatives, and a 'keyword' in parliamentary debate.
Less desirably, perhaps, the rhetoric of 'efficiency' may also have appealed to the deep, persisting current of anti-scholasticism in Australian life-not quite the same as the 'anti-intellectualism' of Clive James' unreliable memoirs, but a current with similar consequences, just the same. Australian universities, as Eric Ashby later recalled, could no longer justify themselves as oases in a cultural desert, bastions of civilisation, whose purpose was to enlighten the heathen sons of merchants and squatters. Above all, they were public institu- 40 and sent a Great White Fleet to prove it; to Herbert Hoover, sometime mining engineer in Kalgoorlie, whose conservative sympathies proved ill-suited to the social policies needed by Depression America. Ironically, it was an inability to see the inherent weaknesses in social engineering that led to progressivism's mixed press. Even as W.H. Warren, professor of engineering at Sydney University, pressed his fellow Australian engineers to work for the public benefit, university anthropologists relied upon scientifically-based arguments to forecast the inevitable extinction of the Aboriginesunless they were 'protected' by the government. 41 Indeed, factored out of the Federal census, Aborigines became non-persons for the next sixty years, until a reforming Federal administration began the process of restoring them their full civil rights.
Even at the time, progressivism as a doctrine appealed clearly to the interests of Australian nationalism, even in its less progressive forms. Australian members of the British Empire League and British Science Guild were frequently united in their approval of the methods and rationale of colonial anthropology, of eugenic policies, and of policies of ethnic immigration designed to ensure a continuing White Australia. 42 In this, they were not necessarily in harmony with their British counterparts. But in speaking to certain wider imperial interests, notably imperial defence, they could speak with one voice. Thomas Laby, Liversidge's student at Sydney, and later a distinguished professor of natural philosophy at Melbourne, was archetypical. Keen advocate of the Australian branch of the Round Table, Indeed, the AAAS proved at least as progressive as its British counterpart. It was by the Medical Section of the AAAS, for example, that Australians were taught to prevent tuberculosis, to consider the sources of mental deficiency, and to improve provision for child health. It was, perhaps, an elitist philosophy-yet, given a fair press, these messages touched many whom the colonial learned societies had failed to reach. Guided first by Liversidge, then by J.H. Maiden of Sydney and David Orme Masson of Melbourne, the AAAS successfully transformed itself from being the principal agent of 'federated', intercolonial science,' into becoming the principal publicist for 'federal' science. Years later, it also became the nursery for the nation's first Academy of Science. Its practical idealism sans doctrine contrived to bring progressive reforms onto the platform of all political parties-at least, before the apocalypse of Gallipoli, Flanders and the Somme, and the depression of the interwar years, put paid to so many of Australia's pre-war visions of progress.
The Contradictions of Progress
It would be wrong to suggest that this half-movement to America, let alone the acceptance of any broad, progressive mandate, was the product of any consistent or systematic reasoning on the part of Australian government, industry, or academia. Progressivism in its Australian form was a blank cheque of limitless possibilities, on which statesmen and scientists could draw airily upon ideals, without worrying too greatly about realities; it was a platform of convenience, on which scientists, social scientists and politicians could for certain purposes join forces, while on others, go their separate ways. Nor can it be said that progressive policies, even when enacted by consensus, Canadian science, a generation earlier). 49 Arriving on the eve of war, with some of its European guests destined for Australian internment, the BA travelled from one capital city to another, much as it has done in South Africa, when, following the Anglo-Boer War, it had consolidated the community of scientists in a symbolic act of Union. 50 In Australia, its presence prompted a review of science as an function of imperial obligation and national sovereignty.
Historians have yet to assess the impact of the BA's visit on the discussions of 1915, which led, past Gallipoli, to the creation of the Institute for Science and Industry. But the coverage given its meetings, coupled with the revelations of the war itself, conveyed a sense of national urgency to the business of science, and projected its scientists, now made known to the public, into the political arena. The war, which threw greater entitlements upon the Federal Government, also required the Federal Government to assume responsibility for meeting imperial mandates, issued by Britain, which only a coherent policy for science and industry could achieve. The prospect was one of opportunity and uncertainty, and the practice, one of experiments, that became the substance of postwar debate. But the events of 1915-1916, while uniting the nation behind its scientists, also revealed tensions with important ramifications for 'Commonwealth science'. Both then and afterwards, these were to undermine and frustrate the political agenda of progressivism. Among these frustrations, I will mention four. There were other important problems bearing upon Commonwealth policy , on which scientific advice might have had a beneficial influence. As Bruce Davidson points out, at none of the thirteen AAAS Congresses before Federation was there any discussion of the division of powers affecting agriculture, although the States' retention of commodity price-fixing powers, the control of Crown land, and the transport system on which agriculture depended, were of obvious economic and scientific importance. Indeed, the AAAS had other failures on its account books; its Agricultural Section failed to confront the devastation of Prickly Pear until 1913, by which time the weed covered 8 million hectares in Queensland and NSW.
52 Perhaps its greatest failure, although the one for which it was least responsible, was its act of self-suspension during the war, when decisions were taken that put thousands of inexperienced ex-servicemen on the land, on small farms in marginal areas. That romantic vision was destined to run its course, and thoroughly disillusion the prophets of progress, well before more rational counsels prevailed.
Questions of federalism affected even scientific organisations. Pressure to make the AAAS (later ANZAAS) and the Australian Association of Chemists (later the RACI) fully representative of scientists from the different states at times threatened efficient self-government. Before the Federal government's translation to Canberra, 'national' organisations of scientists (as of other groups) had to choose their capital allegiances, and by their choice, much was decided. Locating the headquarters of the AAAS in Sydney was initially convenient in 1888, but it was not necessarily the best permanent home for Australia's 'federated scientists'. The city-state identification of Australian scientists remained powerful, long after Federation. The residues are with us today. There remains something faintly anachronistic about a 'National' Museum being in Melbourne, but there is similarly no logic, other than that of history, in an 'Australian' Museum being in Sydney. continued to have an overwhelming influence on the culture of Australian government, science, and industry.
Finally, the rational program of progressivism could not completely ovetake the inertia of public sentiment. Romantic myths of heroic, pioneering individuals exploring the outback and the 'dead heart,' retained their hold on the Australian imagination and in some ways inhibited the acceptance of scientific research as a public responsibility. A belief in boundless riches around the corner, awaiting discovery-an endless frontier of opportunity-proved difficult to displace, as the experience of T. Griffith Taylor, Sydney's professor of geography, bitterly revealed. In his hands, 'environmental determinism' forced attention to the real limitations of white settlement in Australia. It was, ironically, the famous Canadian 'possibilist,' Vilhjamur Stefansson, who became the darling of the environmental imperialists, while Griffith Taylor, true to his progressive views, was forced to move to the less provincial environment of the University of Chicago. 54 The 'lucky country' remains a powerful myth, one with which advocates of science have effected an uneasy alliance.
Conclusion
These observations suggest ways of looking afresh at the years 1895 to 1914 as a critical period in the history of Australian science. Throughout the industrial world, this was a period of experimentation in the organisation of scientific services, as in the application of physics, chemistry, and the biological and earth sciences. In Australia, between the 'march to nationhood' of the 1890s and the massive changes prompted, intensified, and accelerated by the Great War, emerged a set of ideas and practices-some imported, others promoted from within-that set Australia on a course that would ultimately absorb 'efficient imperialism' into a perspective distinctly Australian. Here, however, the history of science meets science policy, and social history meets the predicament of Australia in the world of 'big science' and multinational competition. The progressive impulse of the early Commonwealth years raised expectations that two world wars, a Depression, and many years of low investment in science have failed to dispel. As we begin to recover the origins and bearing of 'Commonwealth science,' especially between now and the celebration of Federation in 2001, it will be useful to reconsider the contributions of such concepts as practical idealism, progressivism and imperial efficiency in creating a 'state of mind' within which an independent-and interdependent-national science came into being. 56 Arguably, such an intellectual framework remains relevant, and its understanding awaits a generation of historians who are ready to turn the axis of received wisdom, until it catches the light. 
